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Introduction

16
How would you feel if you received international recognition for outstanding professional Here, we examine whether feelings predict choice and built a computational model that 29 characterizes this relationship. We turn to Prospect Theory (Fox & Poldrack, 2014; 30 Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986 , 1992 as a starting point in this 31 research. Prospect Theory was not derived by eliciting people's feelings to predict choice, but 32 rather by observing people's choices in order to estimate the subjective value associated with 33 possible outcomes. An implicit assumption of the theory, however, is that subjective value 34 (utility) is a proxy for feelings, which in turn govern choice; "humans described by Prospect
35
Theory are guided by the immediate emotional impact of gains and losses" (Kahneman, 36 2011). This suggests that if we measure a person's feelings associated with different 37 outcomes, we should be able to generate that person's utility function and use it to predict 38 their choices. While Prospect Theory is one of the most influential theories in economics and 39 psychology, this implicit assumption has never been empirically tested. Thus, we do not 40 know if and how feelings guide choice.
41
To address this question, in three separate studies (see Supplemental Material for replication 42 studies), participants reported how they felt, or expected to feel, after winning or losing 43 different amounts of money. We used those self-reported feelings to form a "feeling 44 function"; a function that best relates feelings (expected and/or experienced) to objective 45 value. Next, we used this function to predict participants' choices in a different decision-46 making task. Our findings were replicated in all three studies.
47
2007; Kermer et al., 2006; Yechiam et al., 2014) . A sample size of 59 subjects was therefore 79 required to achieve 85% power of detecting an effect size of .401 with an alpha of 0.05. Data 80 collection was therefore stopped after 59 subjects. Three subjects were excluded: one who 81 showed no variation at all in their feelings ratings, one whose data from the gambling task 82 were lost, and one who missed more than 50% of the trials in the gambling task. Final 83 analyses were run on 56 subjects (22 males, mean age 23.91y, age range 19-35y). With 56 84 subjects included, our post-hoc power to detect a .401 effect size was still 83.8%. All 85 participants gave written informed consent and were paid for their participation. The study 86 was approved by the departmental ethics committee at University College London.
87
Behavioral tasks. Participants completed two tasks, the order of which was counterbalanced. (£0). At the beginning of each trial participants were told how much was at stake and whether 92 it was a win trial (e.g., if you choose the "good" picture, you will win £10) or a loss trial (e.g.,
93
if you choose the "bad" picture, you will lose £10). Their task was then to make a simple 94 arbitrary choice between two geometrical shapes, associated with a 50% chance of winning 95 versus not winning (on win trials) or of losing versus not losing (on loss trials). On each trial 96 participants were told that one novel stimulus was randomly associated with a gain or loss 97 (between £0.2 and £12) and the other novel stimulus with no gain and no loss (£0). Each 98 stimulus was presented once so learning was not possible. There was no way for the 99 participants to know which abstract stimulus was associated with a better outcome. In fact, 100 the probability of sampling each amount was controlled to ensure that each gain and each loss 101 from the range was sampled twice in each block: on one instance this amount was 102 experienced as the outcome (win/loss) and on the other one the outcome was £0 (no win/no 103 loss). Participants reported their feelings by answering the questions "How do you feel now?"
104
(experienced feelings, after a choice) or "How will you feel if you win/lose/don't win/don't 105 lose?" (expected feelings, before a choice), using a subjective rating scale ranging from 106 "Extremely unhappy" to "Extremely happy". In 2 of the 4 blocks (counterbalanced order) 107 they reported their expected feelings (Fig. 1A) , and in the other 2 blocks, they reported their 108 experienced feelings (Fig 1B) . Expected and experienced feelings were collected in different 109 blocks to avoid subjects simply remembering and repeating the same rating. The choice amounts; and (C) a gambling task where they selected between a sure option and a gamble 118 involving the same amounts as those used in the feelings task. Feelings were modeled as a 119 function of value and this resulting feelings function F was used to predict choice in the 120 gambling task. For each trial, feelings associated with the sure option, the risky gain, and the 121 risky loss were extracted and entered in a cross-trials within-subject logistic regression 122 model.
124
2. Gambling Task. Participants completed a probabilistic choice task (Fig. 1C ) in which they 125 made 288-322 choices between a risky 50/50 gamble and a sure option. Importantly, all the 126 amounts used in the gambling task were the same as those used in the feelings task (between 127 £0.2 and £12), such that feelings associated with these outcomes could be combined to 128 predict gamble choice. There were 3 gamble types: mixed (subjects had to choose between a 129 gamble with 50% chance of a gain and 50% of a loss, or sure option of £0), gain-only
130
(subjects had to choose between a gamble with 50% chance of a high gain and 50% chance of 131 £0, or a sure, smaller, gain) and loss-only (subjects had to choose between a gamble with 7 50% chance of a high loss and 50% chance of £0, or a sure, smaller, loss). In Prospect 
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In all these models, represents the value (from -12 to -0. negatively in order to obtain a positive weight), the gain ( , multiplied by its probability 0.5),
183
and the loss ( , multiplied by its probability 0.5) entered as the 3 predictor variables:
Logistic regressions were run on Matlab using the glmfit function, using either expected 185 feelings (Choice Model 1) or experienced feelings (Choice Model 2). To determine whether 186 those modeled feelings predicted choice better than value-based models, 5 other comparisons 187 models were used to predict choice from values (Choice Models 3 to 7; see Supplemental
188
Material for details).
189
In order to be compared across conditions and subjects, weight values were standardized 190 using the following equation (Menard, 2004; Schielzeth, 2010) : Material.
211
Characterizing a "feeling function"
212
Feelings associated with losses and gains were elicited using one of two different scales and 213 the impact of losses and gains on feelings were computed using three different methods (see
214
Supplemental Material for details): as the change from the mid-point of the rating scale, as 215 the change from the previous rating, and as the change from the rating associated with zero 216 outcome (i.e., the rating associated with not winning or not losing the equivalent amount).
217
For all the models described below the latter baseline resulted in the best fit (Table S1 ). Thus
218
we report results using this baseline; however, the results are the same when using the other 219 two methods of calculating feelings (see Supplemental Materials for details).
220
We aimed to characterize a model that best fit feelings to outcome value. Table S2 for 235 BIC and R 2 values), which has one ρ and one β: Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986 , 1992 increased, this diminished sensitivity was more pronounced in experience than in expectation.
277
As a result, for small amounts of money gained/lost people's expectations of how they will 278 feel were more likely to align with their experience. However, as amounts gained/lost 279 increased, people were more likely to overestimate the effect of outcomes on their feelings,
280
expecting to be affected more by gains and losses than they actually were (i.e., the impact 281 bias (Gilbert et al., 1998) ). Graphically, we can observe the growth of the impact bias in Fig to make a decision.
311
To answer this question we used the Feeling Model built above from the data recorded in the 312 first task to predict decisions made in a separate gambling task. To do so we conducted two Choice Models were run on the same set of choice data, loss and risk aversion parameters 336 were estimated using half the choice data; then, all seven Choice Models, including those in 337 which we used extracted feelings rather than values, were run on the exact same test data,
338
made of the other half of the choice data. options (Gain, Loss, Sure option), leading to 6 weight parameters in each regression 
433
These correlations indicate that the greater weight a participant puts on feelings associated 434 with a loss relative to a gain when making a decision, the more loss averse (and less likely to 435 gamble) they are. Note that loss aversion and propensity to gamble are highly correlated,
436
therefore correlations in C and D are not independent from A and B, respectively, and are 437 displayed for illustrations purposes.
441
Discussion
442
The relationship between human feelings and the choices they make has occupied scientists, indicate the computer choice with a button press after it was made. There were no differences 665 in the data between own choice and computer choice blocks, therefore data was collapsed.
666
Even when making their own choices subjects had no control over the outcome, thus it may 667 not be surprising that feelings did not differ between own choice and computer choice. Note,
668
that the above relates only to the task in which we elicited feelings associated with outcomes
669
and not, obviously, to the gambling task.
671
Estimation of Feeling Models
672
All ten Feeling Models were estimated using a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure in
673
Matlab. Given a Feeling Model ( , ) with the set of parameters, the range of outcome 674 values, and the feelings data to be modeled, the residuals from the model can be written as:
Assuming an appropriate normal distribution for the residuals, the likelihood of a given 677 residual ℰ ! is:
where represents the standard deviation of the residuals (an additional parameter to be 680 estimated). Then the fmincon function was used to find the optimal set of parameters ( , ) 681 that minimizes the negative log likelihood (thereby maximizing the likelihood):
BIC scores were then calculated for each subject using the following equation that penalizes In order to assess loss and risk aversion, three models were estimated for each subject using where is the "loss aversion" parameter: a value higher than 1 indicates an overweighing 700 of gains relative to losses during decision-making and a value lower than 1 the converse; 701 and is the "risk aversion" parameter: a value lower than 1 indicates diminishing 702 sensitivity to changes in value and results in risk aversion, while a value higher than 1 703 indicates risk-seeking.
704
These utility values were used in a softmax function to estimate the probability of accepting 705 each gamble (coded as 0 or 1 for each rejected or accepted gamble, respectively):
where is the logit sensitivity or "inverse temperature" parameter, an index of choice 708 consistency for repeated identical gambles, equivalent to the maximal slope of a logistic 709 regression curve: higher values indicate more consistent choices.
710
The three models were used to estimate risk and loss aversion on half the choice data, in 711 order to predict choice from subjective utility on the other half of choice data (see
712
"Comparison models to predict choice" paragraph below).
To predict individual differences in loss aversion from feelings, values were extracted for choice is a mixed gamble between winning £10 and losing £6, the three predictors will be 749 £0*1 (sure option), £10*0.5 (gain), and -£6*0.5 (loss). computed as: 0 (sure option), log(10)*0.5 (gain), and -log(6)*0.5 (loss).
754
The three additional models predicted choice from Prospect Theory-derived subjective utility.
755
To do so, risk and loss aversion parameters were estimated on half the choice data using the 
761
All seven logistic regression choice models were run on the other half of the choice data, in 762 order to be comparable and to avoid circularity for the utility-based models. The gambling
763
task was designed such that each gamble was repeated twice; therefore, one occurrence of losses and gains may impact feelings differently when they are evaluated at the same time.
776
Methods. Thus, a follow-up study was run using exactly the same procedure as before, except 777 that on each trial of the feelings task (Fig. S2) , the outcomes at stake included a gain, a loss,
778
and £0 (rather than gain versus £0 on some trials, and loss versus £0 on different trials).
779
Twenty participants were recruited and tested on this paradigm (12 males, 8 females, mean 780 age = 23.8 years, age range = 19-33). Ten participants completed the feelings task first, and 781 the remaining completed the gambling task first. Block order within the feelings task was 782 also counterbalanced across subjects. The range of amounts and rating scale used were the 783 same as in the second study group of the main study (see "Study groups" paragraph above).
784
Participants were told that each picture from the pair was associated with a certain probability 785 to win, lose, or get £0, and that these probabilities were different for each picture and not
786
shown to them. Therefore participants had to rate their feelings on every trial knowing that 787 each picture chosen could result in a gain, a loss, or a null outcome (£0). To maintain 788 consistency with the previous design, participants were only asked to rate their expected 789 feelings about 2 of the 3 potential outcomes on each trial. These were determined such that 790 each amount from £0.2 to £12 (win or lose) had at least one expected feeling rating 791 associated with it; then the other rating was selected randomly from the other two options.
792
The order of the two ratings was randomized. The impact of losses and gains on feelings 
848
For analysis, ratings associated with losing and with not winning were coded negatively.
849
Analysis then proceeded exactly as in the main experiment. were presented to the subject, always including a gain, a loss, and a null outcome (£0). The 907 design of the gambling task (main text Fig. 1C ) remained the same. 
912
Feelings data collected on the replication and extension study were fit using the same 
942
Feelings data collected on the second replication and extension study were fit using the same The impact of outcomes on feelings was computed using three different methods: as the 975 change from the rating associated with zero outcome (i.e., the rating associated with not 976 winning or not losing the equivalent amount -zero baseline), as the change from the mid-977 point of the rating scale, or as the change from the previous rating. All feeling models were 978 then fit to these feelings data. For all feeling models the zero baseline resulted in the best fit. 
979
